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We analyze a Downsian model of candidate competition with two modiﬁcations. First,
some voters are uncertain about a candidate’s policy choice and about the distribution of
voter preference. Second, if both candidates oﬀer the same policy, voters choose between
them according to their “personality preferences.” Equilibrium outcomes diﬀer from stan-
dard Downsian predictions: the candidate with a personality advantage chooses partisan
policies and gets elected. This departure from the Downsian prediction is most pronounced
when candidates have a weak policy preference and care mostly about winning the election.
In that case, uninformed voters’ equilibrium strategy is to vote for the candidate with the
preferred personality even if on average electing this candidate implies a lower payoﬀ.
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We study a Downsian model of candidate competition in which some voters cannot
observe one candidate’s policy choice. Our goal is to identify conditions under which
voters’ preferences over superﬁcial, readily observable candidate characteristics leads to
policy and election failures; that is, to election outcomes that put a candidate who has
chosen a partisan policy in oﬃce at the expense of a candidate that has chosen the median-
preferred policy.
Voters in our model care about policy but also have a “personality preference” for a
particular candidate. This personality preference is small in the sense that when candidates
choose diﬀerent policies, the candidate with the favored policy is always preferred. All
voters know which candidate’s personality they prefer but some voters are ignorant of one
candidate’s policy position. We model voter ignorance as incomplete information regarding
the policy choice.
There is empirical support for our voter ignorance assumption. Surveys routinely ﬁnd
that the American electorate is poorly informed.1 Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1993) cite a
1990-91 National Election Study survey2 indicating that only 57% of voters could correctly
identify relative ideological positions of the Republican and Democratic parties3 and only
45% of voters could correctly identify the parties’ relative position on federal spending.4
The same survey shows that voters are no better informed of the electorate than they
are of party positions. For example, in the 1990-91 survey only 47% of voters correctly
identiﬁed the party that holds the majority in the Senate.5 (See Delli-Carpini and Keeter
(1993), Table 2).
There is also evidence that ignorant voters react to superﬁcial diﬀerences in candi-
dates. For example, Redlawsk and Lau (2003) conduct mock election experiments that
force subjects to choose between an unattractive candidate who has the right positions
on the issues and a more personally attractive candidate who held many positions that
1 For an early reference, see Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954)
2 The National Election Study survey is conducted by the Survey Research Center, University of
Michigan. The sample size was 449 and consisted of US citizen of voting age.
3 25% of the answers were “incorrect or incomplete” and 18% answered “don’t know.”
4 26% of the answers were “incorrect or incomplete” and 29% answered “don’t know.”
5 17% of answers were incorrect or incomplete and 36% answered “don’t know.”
1the subject disagrees with. Their results show that voters often choose the candidate that
has the more attractive personality and appearance but holds less desirable policy posi-
tions. However, voters with more expertise, measured by their level of interest, knowledge,
and participation, where more likely the choose the unattractive candidate who held the
preferred positions on the issues.
Our analysis combines these two assumptions (voter ignorance, personality preference)
with the hypothesis that candidates have better information about the distribution of voter
preferences than the voters themselves. Voters are unlikely to inﬂuence election outcomes
and therefore have little incentive to get informed. By contrast, the candidates have much
at stake when making a policy choice and hence invest signiﬁcant resources to determine
the distribution of voter preferences. Of course, some of this information may ‘leak’ to
voters. Our model allows for the possibility that those voters know policies are also know
the composition of the electorate. However, uninformed voters remain uncertain about the
distribution of voter preferences.
Our main result demonstrates that the candidate with the personality advantage can
get elected even if he chooses a partisan policy that is not median preferred. Such partisan
policy outcomes will occur even if — in fact, especially if — the candidate with the person-
ality advantage is an oﬃce seeker who cares relatively little about policy and more about
getting elected. When uninformed voters confront oﬃce seekers, they will vote according
to their personality preference. This behavior is optimal even though the candidate with
the preferred personality may on average choose policies that lead to lower utility than the
policies of his opponent. An observer who interprets voting behavior as non-strategic may
therefore conclude that voters place an unreasonably large weight on personality or that
voters have incorrect expectations about their favored candidate’s policy choice.
The fraction of informed voters plays a central role in our analysis. When candidates
are oﬃce seekers, increasing the fraction of informed voters increases the probability of
median preferred outcomes. With few informed voters, candidates who have a personality
advantage will rarely choose median preferred policies. This conclusion is in contrast to
work that emphasizes the information aggregation properties of elections (See McKelvey
and Ordeshook (1985, 1986) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)). Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1997) show that even if the fraction of informed voters is arbitrarily small, the
2outcome of a large election is as if all voters are fully informed. Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer (1997) assume that candidate’s policy choices are exogenous, whereas in our model,
one candidate chooses his policy strategically. Moreover, some voters are uncertain about
policy choices and about the composition of the electorate. This multi-dimensionality
uncertainty implies that elections cannot fully aggregate information.
We consider a very simple and stylized candidate competition model. There are two
candidates; candidate A is committed to a ﬁxed moderate policy m, while candidate B
chooses between a partisan policy l and the moderate policy m. Voters prefer the moderate
policy m to the partisan policy l. If both candidates choose the moderate policy, voters’
personality preference leads them to prefer either A or B. We assume that personality
preference is less important than policy preference; that is, no voter prefers candidate B
if he chooses the partisan policy. In our model, candidate A chooses the median preferred
policy and therefore oﬀers the toughest possible competition for B. Nevertheless, we show
that B is able to exploit voter ignorance to implement the partisan policy.
The standard model of party competition (Downs 1957) has two candidates who maxi-
mize the probability of getting elected. Both candidates choose policies before the election.
V o t e r so b s e r v et h e s ep o l i c i e sa n dc h o o s et h ec a n d i d a t ew h oo ﬀers the more attractive pol-
icy. The model predicts that the median preferred policy will be implemented. Candidate
competition is similar to Bertrand competition: if a candidate chooses a policy other than
the median voter’s favorite, he will be “under-cut” by his opponent. As a result, the
Downsian prediction of median preferred outcomes holds even when the candidates have
policy preferences.
Our model diﬀers from the standard Downsian model in two ways: ﬁrst, we assume
that some voters do not know one candidate’s policy choice and the distribution of voter
preferences. We incorporate policy ignorance into a strategic model by assuming that each
voter observes the realized policy choice with a probability between 0 and 1. To model the
voter’s ignorance of the electorate, we assume that s, the probability that a random voter
prefers A’s personality, is uncertain and that voters do not observe the realized s.W ec a l l
s the state of the electorate.
Second, unlike the voters, candidate B learns the state of the electorate before making
his decision. We say that a candidate has a personality advantage if the probability that a
3voter prefers his personality is greater than 1
2. Our assumption that candidates have better
information about the state of the electorate is motivated by the fact that candidates often
take (secret) opinion polls measuring how their personality is perceived by voters. These
opinion polls may provide precise information.
Our focus is on large elections. Therefore, we study limit equilibria as the number of
voters goes to inﬁnity. We normalize candidate B’s utility function so that his utility of
winning the election with the partisan policy is 1, his utility of losing the election is 0, and
his utility of winning with the moderate policy is μ ∈ (0,1). Hence, μ close to 0 describes
a candidate who derives utility from winning only if he can implement his favored policy
while μ close to 1 describes a candidate who is motivated primarily by winning the election.
If μ is close to 1, we refer to the candidate as an oﬃce seeker.S i n c ew eﬁnd this to be the
more descriptive case, many of our results assume that candidate B is an oﬃce seeker.
We establish the following departures from the standard Downsian model if the can-
didate is an oﬃce seeker:
(1) Non-median Election Outcomes: The candidate who oﬀers the median preferred policy
may lose the election.
(2) Personality Matters: The candidate with the personality advantage wins the election.
If B has a substantial personality advantage, he chooses the partisan policy l.
(3) Information Matters: The probability of the partisan outcome l is decreasing in the
probability that a voter is informed. Hence, the voters’ equilibrium payoﬀ is lower if
the electorate is more ignorant. If the electorate is suﬃciently poorly informed, then
B almost always chooses the partisan policy if he is elected. (Moreover, B wins if he
has a personality advantage.)
(4) Voting on Personality Preference: Ignorant voters vote their personality preference.
In particular, ignorant voters who prefer B’s personality vote for B even if electing B
implies, on average, a lower payoﬀ.
Our results imply that small asymmetries between candidates can have large eﬀects
on election outcomes. Voters behave in this seemingly naive way because they condition on
the event that their vote is pivotal. An oﬃce seeker (μ close to 1) will choose the moderate
policy when he expects the election to be close. Anticipating this behavior, voters conclude
4that conditional on a vote being pivotal, the opportunistic candidate is likely to choose
the moderate policy. As a result, uninformed voters who face an oﬃce seeker behave as
if the opportunistic candidate always chooses the moderate policy and vote according to
their personality preference.
A high probability of choosing the moderate policy when the election is close does not
translate into a high unconditional probability of choosing the moderate policy. Because
an oﬃce seeker receives a large share of the uninformed vote, choose the partisan policy
without risking loosing the election whenever the state is suﬃciently favorable. Condition-
ing on being pivotal creates a wedge between voting behavior and ex ante policy choices.
An lower fraction of informed voters makes this wedge larger. As the fraction of informed
voters goes to zero, the opportunistic oﬃce seeker will choose the partisan policy and win
the election whenever the majority prefers his personality.
In section 4, we discuss robustness and extensions. In section 4.2, we argue that our
main insights are survive a modeling change that gives candidate B more than two policy
choices. We also argue (section 4.3) that a symmetric model with two strategic candidates
would generate similar insights as our simple one-sided model. To isolate the eﬀect of this
asymmetric information, we consider two alternative models with symmetrically informed
candidates and voters. In section 4.4, we assume that neither the candidates nor the voters
observe the state of the electorate while in sec t i o n4 . 5 ,w ea s s u m et h a ta l la g e n t sk n o wt h e
state. In both cases, the Downsian prediction of median preferred outcomes is restored.
Hence, asymmetric information (between the candidate and the voters) about the state of
t h ee l e c t o r a t ei sc r u c i a lf o ro u rr e s u l t s .
Evidence of voter ignorance may be considered puzzling since we might expect political
competition to force candidates to inform voters of their positions. In section 4.1, we
investigate this hypothesis. We ﬁnd that giving a candidate the opportunity to increase
the proportion of informed voters has no eﬀect if the candidate is an oﬃce seeker. Hence,
permitting voluntary disclosure does not mitigate partisan politics or aggregation failure.
This is true even though informing voters is costless. However, our analysis suggests that
informing voters about the opponent’s position, provided such information can be revealed
credibly, may be an eﬀective remedy for partisan politics and aggregation failure. Hence,
we ﬁnd a role for “negative campaigning.”
51.1 Strategic Voters
We describe voting behavior as the equilibrium outcome of a voting game. Hence,
we assume that voters are strategic. There is some experimental evidence that sheds light
on the validity of strategic voting models. Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2005) conduct
experiments based on a voting game with asymmetric information. They ﬁnd that voters
react to changes in the distribution of types of other voters in a way that is qualitatively
consistent with the predictions of Nash equilibrium. In particular, Battaglini, Morton and
Palfrey provide evidence that agents vote against their unconditionally preferred choice
when this choice is inferior conditional on a vote being pivotal.
In their experiment, subjects play a voting game with uninformed, informed and
partisan voters. Partisan voters always vote for alternative a. Informed and uninformed
voters choose between a and b and prefer a in state A and b in state B.U n i n f o r m e dv o t e r s
have a prior probability over states while informed voters know the true state. Equilibrium
predicts that — in the presence of a-partisans — uninformed voters will vote for b even if a is
the better unconditional choice (i.e., a has a higher expected payoﬀ when the uninformed
voter uses his prior to weigh the states). Their experimental evidence is consistent with
this equilibrium prediction.
The Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey experiment uses a diﬀerent setup than the model
presented here. However, in both models, conditioning on being pivotal creates a wedge
between the unconditionally optimal choice and equilibrium behavior. Battaglini, Morton
and Palfrey provide evidence that voters recognize this wedge and react in a way consistent
with equilibrium predictions.
1.2 Related Literature
Several authors have examined the robustness of Downs’ results by introducing pol-
icy motivated candidates and uncertainty about median voter preferences. For example,
Wittman (1977) and Calvert (1985) consider a model with two candidates, uncertain distri-
bution of voter preferences but no asymmetric information. In Chan (2001) and Bernhard,
Duggan and Squintani (2003), candidates have asymmetric information. In all these mod-
els, candidates typically choose distinct policy positions. Because the median’s policy
preference is not known, candidates trade-oﬀ the probability of losing against winning
6with a less desired policy. However, if candidates are oﬃce seekers and mostly care about
winning, their policy positions converge. In contrast, an oﬃce seeker in our model is more
likely to choose a partisan position than a candidate who has a strong policy preference.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), Aragones and Palfrey (2002,
2004) examine Downsian competition models with uncertain median preferences where
one candidate has a “valence” advantage formally equivalent to the personality advantage
analyzed here. Aragones and Palfrey (2002) show that equilibrium entails mixed strategies
and hence candidates typically choose distinct policy positions.
In all related studies of Downsian competition, aggregation failure cannot occur be-
cause voters know candidates’ policy choices. Candidates hope that their partisan positions
will match the realized median preference. Hence, distinct policy positions beneﬁtt h em e -
dian voter in some states of the world. In our model, candidate B chooses a partisan
position even though he knows the median prefers the moderate policy in all states of the
world. Candidate B beneﬁts from this behavior because uninformed voters cannot detect
the partisan choice.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997) study models with asymmetrically informed
voters. The Feddersen and Pesendorfer papers show that large elections eﬀectively aggre-
gate information if policy positions are ﬁxed and voters are uncertain about the “quality”
of the candidates’ policies. Our model has both asymmetrically informed voters and candi-
date competition. In our context, the Feddersen and Pesendorfer result would correspond
to a situation where the opportunistic candidate’s policy is exogenously (and randomly)
chosen. The diﬀerence here is that the candidate’s policy choice is a strategic variable.
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985, 1986) argue that even if voters are ignorant of policy
choices they may still infer which candidate oﬀers the preferred policy from polling data,
endorsements, and other public information. In other words, McKelvey and Ordeshook
argue that ignorance about policy choices alone may not lead to non-median outcomes. In
our model, voters are uncertain about the policy choice and about the state of the elec-
torate. Therefore, voters cannot infer policy choices and non-median outcomes ensue. We
show in section 4 that when voters know the state, the election yields Downsian outcomes
even if an arbitrarily large fraction of voters are ignorant of policy. Hence, as suggested
by the McKelvey-Ordeshook argument, Downsian outcomes are attained whenever voters
can infer policy from public information.
72. The Model
Two candidates stand for election. Candidate A is committed to the moderate policy
m while candidate B chooses between the partisan policy l and the moderate policy m.
Candidate B’s payoﬀ is 1 if he is elected and implements l, μ ∈ (0,1) if he is elected
and implements m, and 0 if he is not elected. The parameter μ quantiﬁes how B trades
oﬀ getting elected and implementing his preferred policy. If μ is close to one, then the
candidate cares mostly about winning the election, while if μ i sc l o s et oz e r ot h ec a n d i d a t e
cares mostly about implementing his preferred policy.
The 2n+1 voters care about the implemented policy and about who wins the election.
There are three possible election outcomes, denoted l,ma,m b,w h e r ema stands for ‘A wins
and implements m’a n dmb stands for ‘B wins and implements m.’ We let o ∈ {l,ma,m b}
denote the election outcome.
Every voter prefers the moderate policy m to the partisan policy l irrespective of who
gets elected. Each voter also has a personality preference that determines his ranking of
the candidates if both choose m. Hence, a voter’s preference type is some j ∈ {a,b} where




1+  if o = mj
1i f o = mi,i6= j
0i f o = l
We assume that  >0.
Voters are assigned a type prior to the election. With probability s ∈ [0,1], a voter is
type a and with probability 1−s av o t e ri st y p eb.W er e f e rt os as the state of the electorate;
it speciﬁes which candidate has a personality advantage. If s>1
2,t h e na-types are more
likely than b-types and hence candidate A has a personality advantage. Conversely, B
has a personality advantage if s<1
2. The probability distribution G describes how s is
chosen. We assume that G has support [0,1] and admits a continuous, strictly positive,
and continuously diﬀerentiable density g.
We analyze the following model of political competition.
(i) Nature draws s according to G and independently assigns each voter type a with
probability s and type b with probability 1 − s. Voters learn their preference types
b u tn o tt h ep r e f e r e n c et y p e so fo t h e rv o t e r s .
8(ii) Candidate B observes s and chooses a policy.
(iii) Each voter is independently informed of B’s realized policy choice with probability
δ ∈ (0,1). Voters do not observe the realized state s.
(iv) Each voter casts a vote for A or B.
(v) The candidate who receives the most votes (n + 1 or more) wins the election and
implements his policy.
We analyze symmetric Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies.W er e f e rt o
such equilibria as voting equilibria. S y m m e t r yr e q u i r e st h a ta l lv o t e r sw i t ht h es a m es t r a t -
egy preferences and information have the same strategy. Note that voters and candidates
may use mixed strategies.
Informed and uninformed a-types have a simple dominant strategy: always vote for
A.I n f o r m e d b-types also have a simple dominant strategy: vote for B if and only if B
chooses m. Hence, the only agents with a non-trivial decision are uninformed b-types. Let
x ∈ [0,1] be the probability that a b-type votes for B.B e l o w ,w ew i l ls u p p r e s st h eb e h a v i o r
of informed and a- t y p ev o t e r sa n dr e f e rt ox as the voters’ strategy.
A strategy for candidate B is a cutoﬀ-strategy if there is y ∈ [0,1] such that B chooses
l if s<yand m if s>y . Since the probability of any single state s is 0, the number
x suﬃces to describe candidate B’s behavior. A voting equilibrium in which candidate B
uses a cutoﬀ strategy is a cutoﬀ equilibrium.6
Proposition 1: There exists a voting equilibrium and every voting equilibrium is a
cutoﬀ equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
Given a voter strategy x ∈ [0,1], let πp(x,s) be the probability that a randomly
selected voter casts a vote for B in state s conditional on B choosing policy p ∈ {l,m}.
If B chooses l, then only uninformed b-types vote for him; if B chooses m,t h e ni n f o r m e d
b-types also vote for him. Hence, we have
6 In a cutoﬀ equilibrium, voters may use a mixed strategy. An earlier version of this paper has voters
diﬀerentiated according to the strength of their personality preference. That model has only pure strategy
equilibria.
9πl(x,s)=( 1− s)(1 − δ)x
πm(x,s)=( 1− s)[(1− δ)x + δ]
(1)
Let Bn(z) be the probability of at least n + 1 successes out of 2n + 1 trials when the








zk(1 − z)2n+1−k (2)
Candidate B wins with probability Bn(πp(x,s)) in state s if he chooses p. Therefore, B
chooses l if
Bn(πl(x,s)) >μ B n(πm(x,s))




Bn(πm(x,s)) is strictly decreasing in s. It follows that if m is optimal at s,t h e n
it is the only optimal action at s0 >s . Hence, the best response must be a cutoﬀ strategy.
We use a ﬁx e d - p o i n ta r g u m e n tt oe s t a b l i s ht h ee x i s t e n c eo fac u t o ﬀ equilibrium.
Our model of policy choice is highly stylized: we assume that one candidate is com-
mitted to a ﬁxed policy while the other candidate has a binary choice. By assuming that
A is committed to m — the policy preferred by all voters — we create the toughest possi-
ble competition for B. Our main result demonstrates that electoral competition cannot
prevent B from getting elected with the partisan policy even if he faces an idealized op-
ponent who is committed to the median preferred policy. In section 4.3, we discuss how
our analysis changes if both candidates have a non-trivial policy choice. The assumption
that B has a binary policy choice simpliﬁes our analysis but is not essential for our results.
In section 4.2, we discuss how our results extend to a model in which B chooses among
multiple policies.
Uninformed voters learn their type but remain uncertain about B’s policy choice and
about the state of the electorate.7 The assumption that candidates are better informed
than voters about the state of the electorate is essential for our results. In sections 4.4
7 Note, however, that a voters’ own preference type is informative about the state of the electorate. In
particular, a’s beliefs about the state of the electorate put more weight on higher states than b’s beliefs
about the state of the electorate in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
10and 4.5, we describe how the analysis changes if there is symmetric information between
voters and candidates.
Candidates are likely to be better informed than voters because information is more
valuable for them. Hence, candidates have a much greater incentive to collect information
than voters. Candidates are reported to spend substantial resources on polling and focus
groups prior to selecting their policies. Of course, some of this information may become
public and accessible to voters. However, not all voters pay attention to this information.
In particular, voters who are uninformed of the policy choices are likely to be uninformed
of the state of the electorate as well.
For any voting equilibrium (x,y), let φo(s)b et h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h eo u t c o m ei n









φma(s)=1− φmb(s) − φl(s)
(3)
Let Φn(x,y) denote the outcome of the voting equilibrium (x,y)a sd e ﬁned by equation
(3). A limit equilibrium is a pair (x,y) such that for every voting game with 2n+1voters,
there exists a sequence (xn,y n) of voting equilibria converging to (x,y). For any limit
equilibrium (x,y), Φ(x,y) denotes the set of limit outcomes associated with (x,y). That
is, φ ∈ Φ(x,y) if there exists voting equilibria (xn,y n) for all 2n+1 voter games such that
(xn,y n)c o n v e r g e st o( x,y)a n dφn(xn,y n)c o n v e r g e st oφ.8
An outcome φ is Downsian if φmb(s)=1f o rs<1
2,a n dφma(s)=1f o rs>1
2.H e n c e ,
an outcome is Downsian if and only if the candidate with a personality advantage wins and
implements the moderate policy. Two diﬀerent Downsian outcomes agree at every s 6= 1
2.
Our second proposition serves as a benchmark. It shows that if the fraction of informed
voters is greater than 1
2, then any limit is Downsian.
Proposition 2: Let δ>1
2. Then, (x,y)=( 1 ,0) is the unique limit equilibrium and
every limit outcome is Downsian.
8 We say that the function φn converges φ if φn(s)c o n v e r g e st oφ(s)a te v e r yc o n t i n u i t yp o i n to fφ.
11Proof: See Appendix.
If δ>1
2, the electorate is suﬃciently informed to ensure that the election outcome (in
a large electorate) is as if all voters observe the policy choice.
3. Poorly Informed Electorates
In this section, we analyze voting equilibria when the probability that a voter is
informed is less than 1
2. Henceforth, we assume δ ∈ (0, 1
2). This assumption ensures that
in a large electorate more than 1
2 of the voters are uninformed and therefore uninformed
voters can be decisive.
The states in which half of the electorate is expected to vote for either candidate,
given the strategy x, play an important role in limit equilibria. We refer to those states
as marginal states.H e n c e , sp(x), policy p’s marginal state at x is the state at which a
randomly drawn voter chooses B with probability 1
2 if B chooses policy p.T h a ti s ,sp(x)







and note that πl(x,0) = 1
2 and therefore l’s marginal state at x is zero. For x<x , l’s






2((1 − δ)x + δ)
(4)
Clearly, both sl and sm are increasing functions of x.M o r e o v e r ,
sl(x) <s m(x) ≤ 1
2
Proposition 3 below establishes that the limit equilibrium cutoﬀ for B is equal to l’s
marginal state sl(x).
12Proposition 3: If (x,y) is a limit equilibrium and φ ∈ Φ(x,y),t h e nx ∈ [x,1],y= sl(x)
and
φl(s)=1 if s<s l(x)
φmb(s)=1 if sl(x) <s<s m(x)
φma(s)=1 if sm(x) <s
Proof: see Appendix
For s<s l(x), Proposition 3 establishes that candidate B chooses the partisan policy
l and wins the election. The probability that a randomly selected voter will vote for
candidate B if B chooses l is greater than 1
2 at any state s<s l(x). Hence, in a large
electorate, B wins with probability (close to) 1 when he chooses l,a n ds i n c eh es t r i c t l y
prefers l to m,h ec h o o s e sl. Therefore, φl(s) = 1 at states s<s l(x).
Proposition 3 also asserts that candidate B chooses the moderate policy at state
s>s l(x). At such states, B loses the election with probability close to 1 if he chooses
l.I nt h a t c a s e ,B is better oﬀ if he chooses m and thereby secures the vote of informed
agents who prefer his personality. At s ∈ (sl(x),s m(x)), informed agents are decisive and
candidate B wins the election. At s>s m(x), candidate B chooses m and loses the election.
The following ﬁgure summarizes Proposition 3.
−Insert ﬁgure 1 here−
Proposition 3 implies that the probability of outcome mb is small whenever the prob-
ability that a voter is informed is small. To see this, note that mb is the outcome in states
s ∈ (sl(x),s m(x)) and therefore is chosen with probability G(sm(x))−G(sl(x)). From the
deﬁnition of sl and sm (equation (4)), it follows that sm(x)−sl(x) converges to 0 uniformly
in x ∈ [x,1] as δ goes to 0. Therefore, the probability of outcome mb is arbitrarily small
when δ is arbitrarily small.










13Proposition 4 characterizes the voters’ equilibrium strategy. We say that x ∈ [x,1] is a
critical point if
(1 − μ) (x)
(≤   for x =1
=   for x ∈ (x,1)
≥   for x = x
(6)
Ac r i t i c a lp o i n tx ∈ (x,1) is regular if l0(x) 6=0 .( N o t et h a tl(x)i sd i ﬀerentiable since g is
diﬀerentiable). A critical point x 6∈ (x,1) is regular if (6) holds with strict inequality.
Proposition 4: If (x,sl(x)) is a limit equilibrium, then x is a critical point. Conversely,
if x is a regular critical point, then (x,sl(x)) is a limit equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix
To get some intuition for Proposition 4, assume for the moment that there are only
two states of the electorate sl, sm with sl <s m and prior probabilities gl, gm respectively.
Assume also that B chooses l in state sl and m in state sm. Furthermore, assume that
the voter’s strategy x is such that sl and sm are marginal states, i.e., a randomly chosen
voter votes for B with probability 1
2 in both states. (Hence, sl,s m, x satisfy Equation (4)
above.)
Let θ be the probability of sl conditional on a b-type’s information and conditional on
being pivotal. Note that the probability that a given b- t y p ev o t e ri sp i v o t a li st h es a m ei n
either state sl or sm. Moreover, the probability of being a b-type voter in state s is equal

















gl(1 − sl)+gm(1 − sm)
(7)
If x ∈ (0,1) is optimal, then a b-type voter must be indiﬀerent between A and B. Hence,
1=( 1− θ)(1 +  )( 8 )
where the left hand side is the expected utility of voting for A and the right hand side
the expected utility of voting for B (conditional on a vote being pivotal and on a b-type’s













(1 − δ)x + δ
(1 − δ)x
(9)




(1 − δ)x + δ
(1 − δ)x
=   (10)
In our model, there are many states. However, as the number of voters becomes large, the
probability of being pivotal is concentrated around the marginal states, sl(x)a n dsm(x).
Hence, conditional on being pivotal and on his information, a b-type voter knows that the
state is in one of two small “critical intervals” around the marginal states. Therefore, the
relative likelihood gl/gm in Equation (10) has to be replaced by the relative likelihood of
the events
El := [s : πl(s,x)i sc l o s et o1 /2a n dB chooses l]
and
Em := [s : πm(s,x)i sc l o s et o1 /2a n dB chooses m]
Consider candidate B’s incentives when πl(s,x)i sc l o s et o1 /2. If B chooses m he
wins with probability close to one because the added vote of the informed voters imply
a vote share greater than 1/2. Therefore, if Bn(πl(s,x)) <μ ,t h e nB strictly prefers the
moderate policy m. We conclude that the interval El is truncated at the state where the
probability of winning drops below μ. Hence, the closer the parameter μ is to 1, the smaller
is the interval El.T h ek e ys t e pi nt h ep r o o fi ss h o w i ng that the relative likelihood of El




(1 − δ)x + δ
(1 − δ)x
at the number of voters becomes large. The (1 − μ) term arises from the truncation
described above and the term
(1−δ)x+δ
(1−δ)x results from the change of variables from π to s.
Substituting the relative likelihood of El and Em for gl/gm in equation (10) yields





(1 − δ)x + δ
(1 − δ)x
¶2
=( 1− μ) (x)= 
and therefore x is a critical point as deﬁn e di n( 6 ) .
153.1 Limit Equilibria when the Candidate is an Oﬃce Seeker
In this section, we consider an oﬃce seeking candidate B who cares mostly about
winning the election; that is μ is close to one. Note, however, that even an oﬃce seeker
has a strict preference for the partisan policy (i.e., μ<1). Proposition 5 below establishes
that if B is an oﬃce seeker, then all uninformed b-types will vote for him.
Proposition 5: There is ¯ μ<1 (independent of δ) such that for μ>¯ μ, the unique limit
equilibrium is (1, 1−2δ





















Proof: Note that  (x) is uniformly bounded for all δ ∈ [0, 1
2]a n da l lx ∈ [x,1]. Therefore,
Proposition 4 ensures the existence of ¯ μ such that μ>¯ μ implies x = 1. The corresponding
φ follows from Proposition 3.
The intuition for Proposition 5 is straightforward: an oﬃce seeker will choose the
moderate policy whenever the election is close and therefore, an uninformed voter believes
that conditional on his vote being pivotal, it is very likely that B will choose m. But then,
all uninformed b-types vote for B.
Although we have assumed that voters are strategic, equilibrium behavior — as char-
acterized in Proposition 5 — seems very naive: uninformed voters simply vote according to
their personality preference. This behavior is optimal because voters expect candidate B
to choose the moderate policy whenever the election is close.
Note that as in the informed electorate benchmark analyzed in Proposition 2, candi-
date B is elected whenever s<1
2, i.e., whenever he has a personality advantage. However,
unlike the informed electorate benchmark, Proposition 5 shows that there is a strictly pos-
itive probability that the outcome is l, the partisan policy. Recall that all voters strictly
prefer m to l irrespective of who implements m. Therefore, the outcome l represents
aggregation failure, i.e., a failure of to choose the median preferred alternative.
16For o ∈ {l,ma,m b},l e t¯ φo = E[φo] denote the ex ante probability of outcome o.
Proposition 5 shows that if B is an oﬃce seeker, the ex ante probability of outcome l is






and the probability of outcome mb is










T h ee xa n t ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tB wins the election is the sum of ¯ φl and ¯ φmb and therefore
is equal to G(1
2) .T h ee xa n t ep r o b a b i l i t yo fo u t c o m ema is




Equation (11) implies that ¯ φl is decreasing in δ and limδ→0 ¯ φl = G(1
2). Equation (12)
implies that ¯ φmb is increasing in δ and limδ→0 ¯ φmb =0 .H e n c e ,w h e nδ is small, the prob-
ability of mb is close to zero and the probability of l is close to its maximum probability
G(1
2). Conversely, we have limδ→ 1
2
¯ φl =0 ,limδ→ 1
2
¯ φmb = G(1
2). Hence, as the propor-
tion of informed voters approaches 1
2, the election outcome approaches the Proposition 2
benchmark: the informed voters are almost always pivotal and candidate B chooses m to
get elected when he has the personality advantage.
Let ub denote the expected utility of a b−type in a limit equilibrium. Hence,
ub = ¯ φma +( 1+ )¯ φmb
Note that if candidate A wins the election (¯ φma =1 )t h e nub = 1. Substituting for ¯ φma


















Proposition 6 shows that for small  , the equilibrium payoﬀ of b-types is less than 1, that
is, less than the payoﬀ when A is elected.








2−2δ) and μ>¯ μ implies ub < 1.
17Proof: Proposition 6 follows from Equation (13) and Proposition 5.
When   is small and candidate B is an oﬃce seeker, uninformed b-types vote for B
despite the fact that electing B implies, on average, a lower payoﬀ than electing A.A n
observer who interprets the behavior of uninformed b-types as non-strategic may conclude
that b-types vote “against their interests” and put an unreasonably large weight on the
candidates’ personalities. However, this analysis misses the point that average payoﬀsa r e
not the correct criterion for strategic voters.
3.2 Limit Equilibria when the Candidate is a Partisan
N e x t ,w ea n a l y z et h eo p p o s i t ec a s ei nw h i c hB has a strong partisan preference.
Proposition 7 shows that if μ is suﬃciently small, then candidate B always chooses the
moderate policy and wins only if he has a signiﬁcant personality advantage.
Proposition 7: There are μ > 0 and   > 0 (independent of δ) such that for μ<μ , < ,





0 if o = l, ∀s ∈ [0,1]











Proof: Note that   is uniformly bounded for all δ ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ [x,1]. Therefore,
Proposition 4 implies that there are μ and   > 0s u c ht h a tf o rμ>μ ,  <  , x = x in any
limit equilibrium. The corresponding φ follows from Proposition 3.
When B is a partisan, voters expect him to choose l even if the election is reasonably
close. As a result, uninformed voters are reluctant to vote for him. This, in turn, forces B
to choose m,s i n c eo t h e r w i s eh ei sa l m o s ts u r et ol o s et h ee l e c t i o n .P r o p o s i t i o n7m a ys e e m
paradoxical because candidate B never chooses l yet voters assume that conditional on a
vote being pivotal there is a signiﬁcant probability that he chooses l.N o t et h a tP r o p o s i t i o n
7 describes the limit of a sequence of equilibria (xn,y n)s u c ht h a tyn converges to 0. Along
the sequence, B chooses l if the state s is close to 0. Hence, for any ﬁnite electorate, the
probability that B chooses l is strictly positive and conditional on a vote being pivotal the
probability that B chooses l stays bounded away from 0 for all n.
18The probability that a partisan wins the election is equal to ¯ φmb, the probability of
outcome mb. Proposition 7 shows that





Hence, the ex ante probability that a partisan wins the election is smaller than in the
benchmark Downsian case. Moreover, that probability is increasing in the fraction of











Hence, when the proportion of informed voters is small, a partisan almost never wins the
election. As the proportion of informed voters approaches 1
2, we converge to the Proposition
2b e n c h m a r k .
Proposition 7 demonstrates a second type of aggregation failure. In states s such
that 2δ
1+2δ <s<1
2, candidate B does not win the election even though he has chosen the
moderate policy and has a personality advantage. Hence, in those states, B is the median
preferred alternative yet loses the election.
3.3 A Uniform Example
When G is uniform, Proposition 4 yields a simple characterization of limit equilibria.
In the uniform case,
 (x)=
µ
(1 − δ)x + δ
(1 − δ)x
¶2
Assume that μ = 7
9 and   = 1
2. Depending on δ, we can distinguish three cases.
Case (i) δ<1
4: Uninformed b-types vote for B with probability 1 in the unique limit








19and therefore ub < 1, for δ<1
4.N o t et h a tub is increasing in δ and ub =1 /2f o rδ =0 .I n
this equilibrium, candidate B is elected whenever he has a personality advantage (i.e., with
probability 1
2). Type b voters’ expected payoﬀ is below 1. Hence, for all voters, election B
is worse on average than electing A.
Case (ii) δ>1
3: The unique limit equilibrium corresponds to the case analyzed in section
3.2:
x = x,y=0
Hence, B chooses the moderate policy in all states and b-types choose the strategy x.F o r
s ∈ [0, 2δ
1+2δ), the election outcome is mb and for s ∈ ( 2δ




Note that ub is increasing in δ and strictly greater than 1. Hence, b-types are better oﬀ on
average if B is elected.
Case (iii) 1
4 <δ<1
3: There are three limit equilibria; the two extreme equilibria identiﬁed












Note that the right hand side of (14) is increasing in δ and hence a higher fraction of
informed voters makes B more likely to choose the partisan policy (within the range given







which is decreasing in δ.
20The interior equilibrium is like a mixed equilibrium in a coordination game. Fixing
the strategies of players, the larger the fraction of informed voters, the more attractive
candidate A becomes. This follows because  (x)i si n c r e a s i n gi nδ. To keep uninformed
voters indiﬀerent despite the higher fraction of informed voters, more uninformed b-types
must vote for B, i.e., x must increase. (Recall that  (x)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nx). More unin-
formed b-types voting for B, in turn, implies more partisan outcomes (a higher y). Hence,
increasing the fraction of informed voters increases the probability of partisan outcomes
and decreases b-types’ payoﬀ along the interior equilibrium trajectory.
The uniform example demonstrates that multiplicity of limit equilibria can occur.
The example also reveals an indirect eﬀect of the parameter δ on election outcomes. For a
ﬁxed μ, ,al a r g eδ implies that only the partisan equilibrium, (x,0), exists while a small
δ implies that only the oﬃce seeker equilibrium, (1, 1−2δ
2−2δ), exists. Intermediate δ values
create the possibility of an interior equilibrium with counter-intuitive comparative statics.
4. Robustness and Extensions
In this section we examine how changing our model aﬀects the results of the previous
section.
4.1 Control of Information
So far, we have assumed that candidates cannot aﬀect voters’ information. Here, we
brieﬂy analyze an extension in which B chooses the fraction of informed voters. Since a
v o t e ri su n l i k e l yt ob ep i v o t a l ,h eh a sl i t t l ei n centive to acquire information. Hence, there
is a tendency for voters to remain ignorant. Our objective is to investigate if candidates
have incentives to combat this tendency.
A si nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h a tB chooses a policy p ∈ {l,m}. Candidate
B also chooses the fraction of voters δ∗ ∈ {δ,∆},w h e r e0<δ<∆ < 1
2, who will be
informed of his policy choice. We assume that voters cannot observe δ∗.
One interpretation of this model is the following. Suppose B must decide how many
informative campaign commercials to run. Them o r ec o m m e r c i a l sa r er u n ,t h em o r el i k e l y
it is that a voter observes the policy choice.
21Since all voters strictly prefer m to l and voters never use weakly dominated strategies,
B will choose δ∗ = ∆ whenever he chooses the moderate policy m and δ∗ = δ whenever
he chooses the partisan policy.9
The following proposition establishes that when μ is close to 1, the equilibrium out-
come is as if δ∗ is ﬁxed at δ. That is, Proposition 8 identiﬁes the same limit equilibrium
as Proposition 5. In other words, B’s ability to disclose additional information (choose
δ∗ = ∆)h a sn oe ﬀe c ti fh ei sa no ﬃce seeker. Limit equilibria and limit outcomes are
deﬁned as in the previous section.
Proposition 8: There is ¯ μ<1 (independent of δ)s u c ht h a tf o rμ>¯ μ, (1, 1−2δ
2−2δ) is the






















For μ close to 1, the fact that B i n f o r m sv o t e r sw h e n e v e rh ec h o o s e sm has no eﬀect
on the equilibrium outcome even though voters know that they are more likely to be
uninformed whenever B chooses l.P r o p o s i t i o n 8 s h o w s t h a t i f δ is close to 0 — that is,
if voters remain ignorant unless B voluntarily discloses information — equilibrium is as
if voters are uninformed. Candidate B chooses l and wins the election whenever he has
a personality advantage. All uninformed voters who prefer B’s personality vote for him.
Hence, when candidate B has control over information, the eﬀect described in section 3 is
exacerbated.
4.2 Multiple Policies
Suppose candidate B chooses among three policies p ∈ {l1,l 2,m} and he prefers l1
to l2 and l2 to m. If all voter types prefer ma to l2 and l1, then our analysis remains
9 Choosing (l,∆)c o u l db eo p t i m a li fx = 0. But, if all uninformed voters vote for A,t h e nB’s unique
best response is to choose (m,∆). Hence, B cannot choose (l,∆) in equilibrium.
22unchanged. Candidate B will choose either policy l1 or policy m. He will never choose the
intermediate policy l2 because choosing l2 does not win any informed voters.
The many policy extension is more interesting if some b- t y p ev o t e r sh a v em o r ei n t e n s e
personality preferences than others. Suppose weak b-types prefer B only if he chooses m
and strong b-types prefer B if he chooses l2 or m. Then, in any the state, B will choose the
most partisan policy that guarantees a vote share greater than 1
2. Hence, candidate B may
choose all three policies. Such a model is more diﬃcult to analyze because the inference
conditional on a vote being pivotal is more complicated. However, if B is an oﬃce seeker,
he will switch to a less partisan policy whenever the probability of losing exceeds some
small threshold. Hence, as in our two-policy model, conditional on a vote being pivotal,
B is unlikely to choose l1 or l2 and hence uninformed voters will believe that B chooses m
with probability close to one. This implies that all uninformed b-types (strong and weak)
will vote for B. We conclude that the analysis of section 4 is valid even if candidate B has
multiple policy options.
4.3 Both Candidates have Policy Choice
In our model, candidate A is committed to the policy that all voters prefer. One
could extend our model so that A chooses between m and a partisan policy r.A sn o t e d
in section 4.2, the inference conditional on a vote being pivotal is more diﬃcult with more
than two critical states. However, any candidate who is an oﬃce seekers will switch to the
moderate policy when the probability of losing the election with the partisan policy exceeds
some small threshold. As a result, conditional on a vote being pivotal, voters expect both
candidates to choose the moderate policy. Hence, we conjecture that a symmetric version
of our model would yield a result analogous to Proposition 5.
4.4 Uninformed Candidates
The assumption that candidates have better information about voter preferences plays
a central role in our analysis. To illustrate the importance of this assumption, we modify
the election game so that candidate B cannot observe the parameter s.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w e
assume that G is uniform on [0,1]. Thus, neither candidate B nor the voters know the
distribution of preferences. This means that B’s policy choice cannot depend on s and is
23simply his probability of choosing m. Voters strategies are the same as in section 3. Limit
equilibria (x,z) and the corresponding limit outcomes Φs(x,z)a r ed e ﬁn e da si ns e c t i o n3 .
Proposition 9 below shows that if μ is above 1−2δ
1−δ ,t h e nx =1 ,z =1i st h eu n i q u e
equilibrium. That is, the game where neither voters nor candidate B knows the distribution
of preferences yields again the Proposition 2 benchmark: there is no aggregation failure
and no partisan politics.
Proposition 9: If candidate B is uninformed, then (1,1) is the unique limit equilibrium
and every limit outcome is Downsian.
Proof: See Appendix.
There is an ε>0 such that given any voter strategy x, the probability that B wins if he
chooses m (without knowing the state) is at least ε higher than if he chooses l. Therefore,
an oﬃce seeker will always choose m and all b-types will voter for him. Hence, partisan
politics and aggregation failure cannot occur if B is an uninformed oﬃce seeker. This model
re-produces the standard Downsian prediction of median preferred policy outcomes.
4.5 Informed Voters
In this section, we assume that both voters and candidates observe the state s before
they choose their actions. A strategy proﬁle is a pair (X,Z), where X(s) is the probability
that an uninformed b-type votes for B given state s and Z(s) is the probability with which
candidate B chooses m in state s.W h e nX ≡ x or Z ≡ z a r ec o n s t a n tf u n c t i o n s ,w ew r i t e
(x,z)r a t h e rt h a n( X,Z). The deﬁnitions of π and of φ are unchanged. Proposition 10
shows that median preferred outcomes result even if δ is small.
Limit equilibria and the corresponding limit outcomes are deﬁned as above. Propo-
sition 10 states that if the voter know the distribution of preferences, then the moderate
policy m is implemented with probability 1. Hence, the fact that most voters do not know
B’s policy choice has virtually no impact on the election outcome. Moreover, candidate B
is elected if and only if he has a personality advantage. That is, personality aﬀects who
gets elected but does not inﬂuence the policy outcome.
Proposition 10: If voters and candidates both observe the state, then (1,1) is the only
limit equilibrium and every limit outcome is Downsian.
24Proof: See Appendix.
Together, Propositions 9 and 10 show that voter ignorance by itself cannot yield par-
tisan politics and aggregation failure; non-Downsian outcomes can occur only if candidates
have better information regarding the state of the electorate than the typical voter.
We can contrast Proposition 10 with the Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) informa-
tion aggregation results. Suppose that B’s strategy z ∈ (0,1) is ﬁxed and s<1
2.I fm is
realized, then most voters prefer B (when n is large) whereas if l is realized, the majority
prefers A. The Feddersen and Pesendorfer result implies that for a ﬁxed strategy z and
large n, candidate B is elected with probability close to 1 if the realized action is m and
candidate A is elected with probability close to 1 if the realized action is l.
In our model, the strategy z is not ﬁxed but endogenous. Proposition 10 pins down
both voter and candidate behavior. For s<1
2 and n large, B chooses l with positive
probability and conditional on choosing l wins with positive probability. Nevertheless,
information is aggregated because the probability that B chooses l converges to 0.
Next, we provide intuition for Proposition 10. Recall that πo denotes the probability
that a randomly chosen voter votes for B if B chooses policy o ∈ {l,m}.I fπl is less than
1
2 and bounded away from 1
2,t h e nB strictly prefers m to l when n is large. This is clear
if B’ sv o t es h a r ei sg r e a t e rt h a n1
2 conditional on m, which would mean that he wins for
sure with m and loses for sure with l.I fh i sv o t es h a r ei sl e s st h a n1
2 in both cases, then
his probability of winning goes to 0 with eith e rp o l i c y ,b u ti tg o e st o0m u c hf a s t e ri fh e
chooses l than if he chooses m. Hence, in both cases, B strictly prefers m to l.
T h es e c o n ds t e pi st on o t et h a tf o rl a r g en, candidate B must mix in equilibrium. If
B were to choose l for sure, then πl =0 .T h e n ,b yt h ea r g u m e n ta b o v e ,h es t r i c t l yp r e f e r s
m.I fB were to choose m for sure, then the uninformed voters would guarantee victory
for B no matter which policy he chooses, i.e., πl > 1
2.T h e n ,B strictly prefers l.
The third step is to observe B’s indiﬀerence between l and m, implies that πl converges
to 1
2.I f πl stays bounded above 1
2,t h e nB wins for sure with l and hence would never
choose m.I f πl stays bounded below 1
2, then the rate of convergence argument above
establishes that B strictly prefers m, contradicting the fact that he must be indiﬀerent
between l and m.
25Finally, since the probability of winning with l converges to 1
2 (and therefore the
probability of winning with m converges to 1), conditional on a vote being pivotal, it is
much more likely that B has chosen l than m. Therefore, to maintain the uninformed
voters’ incentives, B must choose l with vanishing probability as n goes to inﬁnity. Hence,
in large electorates, B will choose m almost all the time and almost always wins when he
has a personality advantage.
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed how candidate competition is altered when most voters do not know
t h ep o l i c yc h o i c e s .W es h o wt h a tw h e nac a n d i d a t ei sa no ﬃce seeker with a weak partisan
preference, voter ignorance will enable him to implement partisan policies without suﬀering
a reduced probability of winning the election. Uninformed voters behave as if the oﬃce
seeker always chooses the median preferred policy.
One consequence of this eﬀect is that candidates have little incentive to spend resources
on informing voters. Providing an oﬃce seeker with the opportunity to inform voters
costlessly has does not aﬀect the equilibrium outcome. As long as voters are convinced
that a candidate will “do what it takes” to get elected, voter ignorance does not harm
his chance of getting elected. At the same time, a poorly informed electorate allows the
candidate to choose policies that closer match his policy preference.
To simplify the exposition, we have considered a one-sided model in which only candi-
date B has a non-trivial policy choice and assumed that candidate A is committed to the
median preferred policy. Hence, A provides the stiﬀest possible competition for the oppor-
tunistic candidate B. As our main result shows, even in this case, the median preferred











Proof: (i) The binomial theorem implies that
Z z
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(−1)k (A1)
Next, we show that
Bn(z)=
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(−1)k (A2)
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We conclude from (A1) and (A2) that
A ·
R z
0 θn(1 − θ)ndθ
R 1
0 θn(1 − θ)ndθ
= Bn(z)
for some constant A>0. Clearly, A =1s i n c e
1=Bn(1) = A ·
R 1
0 θn(1 − θ)ndθ
R 1
0 θn(1 − θ)ndθ
= A
w h i c hp r o v e sp a r t( i ) .
Lemma 2: Let ¯ z>z ,s∈ [0,1).T h e n ,
Bn((1−s)z)
Bn((1−s)¯ z) is strictly decreasing in s.
Proof: Clearly it suﬃces to show that lnBn((1−s)z)−lnBn((1−s)¯ z)) is strictly decreasing







By Lemma 1, (A6) is equivalent to
((n +1 ) ( 1− y) − ny)
R y
0 ζn(1 − ζ)ndζ − yn+1(1 − y)n+1
(
R y
0 ζn(1 − ζ)ndζ)2 < 0( A8)
Substituting v = ζ − ζ2 yields
R y



























= yn+1(1 − y)n −
2n +1
n +1















Hence, h0(y) < 0a sd e s i r e d .
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We will show that B’s best response to voter strategy x is a cutoﬀ strategy. A best
response requires B to choose m whenever
μ · Bn(πl(x,s)) <B n(πm(x,s))




Bn(πm(x,s)) is strictly decreasing in s.R e c a l lt h a tπl(x,s)=( 1− s)(1 − δ)x
and πm(x,s)=( 1− s)[(1 − δ)x + δ]. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2 to conclude that
Bn(π
l(x,s))
Bn(πm(x,s)) is strictly decreasing in s.
T op r o v et h a te q u i l i b r i u me x i s t s ,d e ﬁne
τn(x,y): =
R y
0 πl(x,s)n(1 − πl(x,s))n(1 − s)g(s)ds
R 1
y πm(x,s)n(1 − πm(x,s))n(1 − s)g(s)ds
(A9)
Let τn(x,y)=∞ if the denominator in (A9) is 0. Note that τn(x,y)i st h er a t i oo ft h e
probability that B chooses l to the probability that B chooses m for b-type voter given
that he is pivotal; that is, τn(x,y)= θ
1−θ. An uninformed b−type voter will (weakly)
prefer candidate B if and only if
τn(x,y) ≤  
Deﬁne
ρn(x,y) := min[max[x +   − τn(x,y),0],1]
It follows that x is a best response to (x,y) if and only if ρn(x,y)=x.




















Note that σn is well-deﬁned since
Bn(πl(x,s))
Bn(πm(x,s)) is strictly decreasing and continuous in
s. The cutoﬀ σn(x)i sB’s best response to x.L e t νn(x,y)=( ρn(x,y),σ n(x)) for all
(x,y) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1]. The lemma below follows from the above observations:
Lemma 3: The strategy proﬁle is (x,y) is a cut-oﬀ equilibrium if and only if it is a
ﬁxed-point of νn.




Bn(πm(x,s)) is continuous in (x,s), σn is also continuous. We conclude that a
ﬁxed-point of νn :[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1] × [0,1] exists.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
If δ>1
2,t h e nπl(x,s) < 1
2 for all x,s ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, Bn(πl(xn,0)) → 0 for any
sequence of voting equilibria (xn,y n). Since πm(x,0) − πl(x,0) = δ>0, this implies that
Bn(πl(xn,0))/Bn(πm(xn,0)) → 0. Therefore, Bn(πl(xn,0)) <μ B n(πm(xn,0) for large n.
It follows yn =0f o rl a r g en.B u tyn = 0 implies that xn =1s i n c eB always chooses m.
The characterization of outcomes follows from a straightforward application of the law of
large numbers.
6.3 Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
The proofs below will use the functions τn,ρ n,σ n as deﬁned in the proof of Proposition
1. Recall that τn is the relative likelihood that candidate B will choose l as opposed
to m, conditional on any voter i being pivotal and of type b.W e e x t e n d t h e f u n c t i o n
sl :[ x,1] → [0,1] continuously to [0,1] by setting sl(x) = 0 for all x<x .
Lemma 4: The sequence σn converges uniformly to sl.
Proof: If not, there exists ε>0 and a sequence xn,s u c ht h a tσn(xn) − sl(xn) >εfor
all n. Since the sequences xn,σ n(xn)b o t hl i ei nc o m p a c ts e t s ,w ec a na s s u m et h a tt h e y
30converge to some x,y ∈ [0,1] respectively such that |y − sl(x)| ≥ ε.I fy − sl(x) ≥ ε,t h e n
choose s0,s 00 such that [s0,s 00] ⊂ (sl(x),y) and note that there exist N such that for all
n ≥ N candidate B chooses m in any state s ∈ [s0,s 00] and loses with probability arbitrarily
close to 1 even though he would have won with probability arbitrarily close to 1 had he
chosen l, contradicting the fact σn is his best response. Similarly, if sl(x) − y ≤ ε,t h e n
choose s0,s 00 such that [s0,s 00] ⊂ (sl(x),min{y,sm(x)}) and note that there exist N such
that for all n ≥ N, candidate B chooses l in any state s ∈ [s0,s 00] and loses with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 even though he would have won with probability arbitrarily close to
1b yc h o o s i n gp o l i c ym, again, a contradiction.
Lemma 5: Let (xn,y n) be a convergent sequence of equilibria converging to (x,y).
Then, (i) x ≥ x and y<1
2; (ii) yn > 0 for n suﬃciently large; (iii) 0 <y n for all n implies
limBn(πl(xn,y n)) = 1
μ.
Proof: (i) If x<x ,t h e n ,πl(xn,y n) ≤ 1
2 − η for some η>0a n df o rn suﬃciently large
and therefore τn(xn,y n) → 0. Note that ρn(xn,y n) >x n whenever xn < 1. But Lemma 3
ensures that ρn(xn,y n)=xn, a contradiction.
(ii) Note that sl(x) < 1
2 for all x and therefore y<1
2 follows from Lemma 4. Suppose
there is a subsequence ynj =0f o ra l lnj.T h e n ,τnj(xnj,y nj) = 0 and hence xnj =1f o r
all nj. Hence, Lemma 4 implies limynj = limsl(xnj)=sl(1) > 0, a contradiction.
(iii) Part (ii) implies 0 <y n < 1
2.T h e n , μ =
Bn(π
l(xn,yn))
Bn(πm(xn,yn)) and Lemma 4 en-
sures that πl(xn,y n)c o n v e r g e st o1
2. Therefore Bn(πm(xn,y n)) converges to 1 and hence,
Bn(πl(xn,y n)) converges to 1
μ.
Lemma 6: Assume (i) liman = 1
2, limαn = α ∈ (1
2,1], limbn = b ∈ [0, 1
2),a n d
limβn = β ∈ (1
2,1]. (ii) {f1,h 1,f 2,h 2,...} are equicontinuous functions on [0,1] such















an zn(1 − z)nfn(z)dz
R βn
bn zn(1 − z)nhn(z)dz











Step 1: limrn = r<t= limtn and 1






2 <rand choose y,y0 ∈ (1
2,r) such that y>y 0.( T h e p r o o f t<1
2 is
symmetric and omitted.) Note that qn is a strictly quasiconcave function and attains its
unique maximum at 1
2. Hence, qn(x) ≤ qn(y) <q n(y0)f o ra l lx ≥ y and qn(x) ≥ qn(y0)f o r



















< 1, step 1 follows.
Step 2: limrn = r<t= limtn and 1





Choose η ∈ (0,min{1
2 − r,t − 1




































32The equicontinuity of fn,h n ensures that for any η>0, there exists η0 > 0s u c ht h a t
for n large enough
[fn(1
2) − η]Zn(an, 1







2 − η0, 1
2 + η0) ≤ Dn ≤ [hn(1
2)+η]Zn(1





Using the expressions above to bound Nn
Dn, then dividing terms by Zn(0,1), letting n































Lemma 7: Suppose (xn,y n) is a voting equilibrium for the game with 2n+1voters and
(xn,y n) converges to (x,y). Then, (i) x <ximplies limτn(xn,y n)=( 1−μ) (x);( i i )x = x
and η>0 implies τn(xn,y n) ≤ (1 − μ) (x)+η for all n suﬃciently large.
Proof: Let an := πl(xn,y n),α n := πl(xn,0),b n := πm(xn,1),β n := πm(xn,y n). Since
(xn,y n)i sc o n v e r g e n t ,i tf o l l o w st h a t( an,α n,b n,β n)c o n v e r g e st os o m e( a,α,b,β). Note
that a = 1
2 and since δ>0, it follows that β>1
2.S i n c e x>x ,w eh a v eα>1
2.S i n c e
πn(x,1) = 0, we have b<1
2.


















n (r))(1 − zm
n (r))
(1 − δ)xn + δ
33and zo
n(r) is the unique solution to πo(xn,zo
n)=r for o ∈ {l,m}.
Since xn → x,t h ef u n c t i o n s{hl
n,h m
n } for n =1 ,... are equicontinuous. Also, by









(1 − δ)x + δ





















































and since an = πl(x,y), Lemma 5(iii) yields Bn(an)= 1
μ. Then, (A10) establishes that
limτn =( 1− μ) (x)a sd e s i r e d .
(ii) For x = x,n o t et h a tl i m αn = 1
2 and hence, we cannot apply Lemma 6. Deﬁne,
ˆ hl as follows: ˆ hl
n(r)=hl
n(r)f o rr ≤ αn and hl
n(r)=hl
















Repeating the argument above for the last term of (A11) yields the desired bound.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Lemma 4 implies that y = sl(x) for any limit equilibrium (x,y).
Lemma 5 (i) implies that x ∈ [x,1]. Note that at s<y , πl(x,s) > 1
2;a ts ∈ [y,sm(x)),
34πm(x,s) > 1
2;a n da ts>s m(x), πm(x,s) < 1
2. Hence, the characterization of φ follows
t h el a wo fl a r g en u m b e r s .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :Let (x,y) be a limit equilibrium. Then ,t h e r ee x i s t se q u i l i b r i a
(xn,y n) such that (xn,y n)c o n v e r g e st o( x,y). By Lemma 4, y = sl(x) and by Lemma
3, xn > 0 implies τn(xn,y n) ≤   (with equality if x<1). By Lemma 7(i), τn(xn,y n)
converges to (1−μ) (x)i fx>x . Hence, x>ximplies (1−μ) (x) ≤   and (1−μ) (x)= 
if x <x<1. If x = x, then Lemma 3 implies   = τn(xn,y n) and Lemma 7(ii) implies
that for any η>0, τn(xn,y n) ≤ (1 − μ) (x)+η for all n suﬃciently large. Therefore,
  ≤ (1 − μ) (x)i fx = x.
Let x be a regular critical point. We will show that for η>0, there is N such that
for n>Nthere is a voting equilibrium (xn,y n)w i t h|(xn,y n) − (x,sl(x))| <η .
First, consider x ∈ (x,1) and let η>0. Since x is regular, there is x0,x 00 such that
x0 <x<x 00 and x−x0 <η ,x 00 −x<ηand (1−μ) (x0) < =( 1−μ) (x) < (1−μ) (x00).
Moreover, since sl is continuous, we may choose x0,x 00 such that |sl(ˆ x) − sl(x)| <ηfor
all ˆ x ∈ [x0,x 00]. Let y0
n = σn(x0),y00
n = σn(x00). By Lemma 4, there is N0 such that for
n>N 0, |sl(ˆ x) − σn(ˆ x)| <ηfor all ˆ x. By Lemma 7(i), there is N00 such that for n>N 0,
τn(x0,y0
n) < and τn(x00,y00
n) >  .L e t n>N=m a x {N0,N00}.C o n t i n u i t yo fτn and σn
imply that there is x∗ ∈ [x0,x 00] such that τn(x∗,σ n(x∗)) =  . By Lemma 3, (x∗,σ n(x∗)) is
an equilibrium. Note that |(x∗,σ n(x∗)) − (x,sl(x))| < 3η.S i n c eη is arbitrary the desired
result follows.
Next, let x = x.S i n c e x is regular, there is x>xsuch that x − x <ηand
τn(x,σn(x)) > for n suﬃciently large. Note that σn(x − η)=0f o rn suﬃciently
large. Now, we can repeat the argument above to prove the existence of an equilibrium
(x∗,σ n(x∗)) such that |(x∗,σ n(x∗)) − (x,s l(x))| < 3η.
Finally, let x =1 .S i n c ex is regular, we conclude that τn(1,σ n(1)) < for n suﬃciently
large. Hence, by Lemma 3, (1,σ n(1)) is an equilibrium. By Lemma 4, |σn(1) − sl(1)| <η
for n large. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
357 . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
Adapting the analysis of the previous section to this new game is straightforward. Marginal






2((1 − ∆)x + ∆)











With these modiﬁed deﬁnitions, Proposition 4 holds for the new game. Now, we can repeat
the argument for Proposition 5 to prove Proposition 8.
8 . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9




close to 0. Hence, μ · Bn(πl(s,x)) <B n(πm(s,x)) for large enough n. Therefore, z =1i s
the only optimal strategy for B,i m p l y i n gx =1 .
Next, assume that x ≥ x.R e c a l lt h a ti na n yl i m i te q u i l i b r i u m ,a ta n ys t a t es<s l(x),
candidate B wins no matter what policy he chooses; wins if he choose m at states s<
sm(x); and he loses at any state s>s m(x)n om a t t e rw h a tp o l i c yh ec h o o s e s .H e n c e ,( s i n c e
G is uniform), the probability that B wins if he chooses m is sm(x), while the probability




Substituting for sl,s m we can rewrite this equation as
1 − μ<
δ
(1 − δ)x(2x(1 − δ)+2 δ − 1)




36Then, z =1w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sx = 1 as desired.
9 . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0
For s>1
2, the law of large numbers ensures that B loses in any limit equilibrium
no matter which strategy he chooses. However, his probability of winning goes to 0 much
faster if he choose m than if he chooses l.S o ,Z(s) = 1 and therefore Z(s) = as desired.
Next, assume s<1
2 and the sequence of equilibria (Xn,Z n) converging pointwise to the
limit equilibrium (X,Z). Since s is ﬁxed, we omit the argument s in πp and let xn = Xn(s),
zn = Zn(s).
If zn = 0, then voter optimality implies xn = 0 and therefore deviating to zn =1
strictly increases candidate B’s expected payoﬀ.H e n c e , f o r a l l n, zn > 0. Next, note
that if zn =1 ,t h e nπm =1− s>1
2 and the result again follows from the law of large
n u m b e r s .H e n c e ,o n l yt h ec a s ew here (along some subsequence) zn ∈ (0,1) for all n is left
to consider.
Since B c h o o s e sb o t hp o l i c i e sw i t hs t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t yh em u s tb ei n d i ﬀerent
between them. Hence,
μBn(πm(xn)) = Bn(πm(xn)) (A13)
Next, we show that (8) implies limπl(xn)=1
2.I fπl(xn) ≥ 1
2 +η along any (sub)sequence
xnj,t h e nl i m
Bnj(π
l(xnj))
Bnj(πm(xnj)) = 1, violating (8). Similarly, πl(xnj) ≤ 1
2 − η for all n implies
Bnj(π
l(xnj))
Bnj(πm(xnj)) = 0, again violating (A13). Since πl(xn)c o n v e r g e st o1
2,l i m xn > 0. Then,
voter optimality requires that θ
1−θ ≤  ,w h e r eθ is the conditional probability that candidate















πl(xn)n(1 − πl(xn))n (A14)















n converges to inﬁnity since
πl(xn)c o n v e r g e st o1
2 and πm(xn) is bounded away from 1
2.T h e r e f o r e ,l i m xn > 0i m p l i e s
limzn = 1 and the probability of B winning conditional on choosing m converges to 1, as
desired.
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